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The article analyzes the competition policy’s role in network industries (energy, tele-
communication and railway sector) from points of view regulation and deregulation 
and institutional aspects of the competition policy in Estonia taking into account the 
particular developments in some transition countries and practices, which seem to be 
relevant for further regulating developments in Estonia. 
 
The main objective of the article is to find out, what type of institutional arrangement 
is suitable for regulating network industries in Estonia. Under the observation are in-
stitutional and organizational aspects of competition in abovementioned sectors. The 
article has two parts: First part focuses on particular law, which regulates network 
industries in Estonia; the second part analyzes institutional and organizational as-
pects of regulation and competition policy.  
 
Considering possibilities for regulation in network industries there are analyzed three 
different models: single sector-specific regulators and competition board; integrated 
multi-sector regulatory institution and separate competition board; and unitary com-
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Current article analyzes the competition policy’s role in network industries (energy, 
telecommunication and railway sector) from points of view regulation and deregula-
tion and institutional aspects of the competition policy in Estonia taking into account 
the particular developments in some transition countries and practices, which seem 
to be relevant for further regulating developments in Estonia.  
 
The main objective of this article is to find out, what type of institutional arrangement 
is suitable for regulating network industries in Estonia. Under the observation are in-
stitutional and organizational aspects of competition in abovementioned sectors. The 
article has two parts: First part focuses on particular law, which regulates network 
industries in Estonia; Second part analyzes institutional and organizational aspects of 
regulation and competition policy. 
 
The connection between competition policy and regulation is not always clear 
enough and is complex problem. Some kind of rivalry between those two shows up in 
certain phases during the deregulation of an industry or the transformation of former 
state monopolies into competitive markets. As it has been pointed out, in practice, the 
conflict between competition policy and regulation often arises as one between com-
petition authorities and sector-specific regulators (Kirchner, 2004).  
 
From institutional economics approach competition policy is seen as application and 
enforcement of competition law by competition authorities and courts. Regulation in 
this context is as sector-specific regulation enforced by regulatory authorities and law 
courts. Competition policy is public policy instrument to prevent constraints on com-
petition. The goal of competition policy is to keep markets free from restrictive prac-  3
tices in order to safeguard freedom of choice against business practices which have 
negative welfare effects.  
 
Competition policy itself cannot create competition. It can only prevent or limit the 
effects of certain activities restricting freedom of competition. Of course there are lim-
its to the effectiveness of competition policy, and there are markets in which competi-
tion policy will lead to satisfactory results and other markets which need regulation in 
order to attain the efficiency goal.  
 
Competition authorities and sector regulators have different core competencies. 
These core competencies influence the types of tasks best accomplished by each. 
Sectoral regulation is frequently overseen by sector regulators. Sector regulators 
typically have extensive, ongoing knowledge of the technical aspects of the products 
and services that are regulated. Sector regulators are more likely better suited to 
technical regulation than competition authorities (The relationship between … 2005). 
 
1. Developments in Law: Regulation and Deregulation in Network Industries in 
Estonia 
In general competition policy and regulation may be competing institutional devices in 
situations in which regulation is being cut back or abolished (deregulation) or in which 
former state monopolies will be transformed into competitive markets (transforma-
tion). Deregulation in this context can be viewed as a shift of regime, from regulation 
to competition policy. Transformation of state monopolies is a dynamic process and it 
is an essential part of economic policy in the European Union and its member coun-
tries.  
 
The competition replacement with public regulation is economically reasonable only 
in exceptional areas and even here, only in essence of natural monopolies, for ex-
ample, different supplying and distributional networks. Still, there is need to point out, 
that it concerns only managing the essence of monopoly – the networks, but it does 
not apply to their operating. Also the technological progress is capable to undermine 
the essence of natural monopolies as the mobile communication progress shows.  
   4
However regulation can reproduce competition policy as pointed out about competi-
tion policy’s role in regulatory reform process by some authors (Wise 1998). Rules 
and regulators may have tried to prevent co-ordination or abuse in an industry and 
then it is just as competition policy does. For example, different regulators may apply 
different standards and changes in regulatory institutions may reveal that seemingly 
duplicate policies may have led to different practical outcomes.  
 
In Estonia the corresponding law is in developing phase. The general framework here 
is designed by Competition Act Chapter IV. The §14 and 15 from the Chapter IV de-
fine the owner’s essential facility accordingly the exclusive and sole rights, including 
the owner of the natural monopoly. There are also dopted several exclusive rights as 
following: Energy Act regulating the fuel and energy sector (1997, reformed as Elec-
tricity Market Act in 2003), Railway Act (1999, renewed version from 2003 is in force 
from 31.03.2004), Cable Communication (1999) and also the general Telecommuni-
cation Act (2000) and recently Electronic Communication Act (2004, 2007).  
 
In the Competition Act the natural monopoly is observed as the base for dominant 
position. The natural monopoly is connected with property rights concerning the par-
ticular network or infrastructure, which is impossible or unreasonable to duplicate, but 
without the access to it there is no opportunity to operate in particular market. In such 
situation government and local governments have right to price control, it is “because 
the consumers of particular companies product or sellers to those companies cannot 
fall into essentially worse situation compare to the situation, when the free competi-
tion is in place in the particular sector” (§ 17). In theory the described approach is 
known ‘just-as-conception’. Therefore the invisible hand of market is replaced by visi-
ble hand of state. The Act formulates also the main obligations of the monopolists (§ 
18): 
 
 • Guaranteeing the access to the networks and infrastructure in reasonable and non-
discriminative conditions in order to supply or sell the products;  
• Guaranteeing the transparency in accounting.  
Already the first Estonian Energy Act (RT I 1998, 71, 1201) met the principles of the 
European Union Internal Electricity Market first Directive (currently is in force the   5
second Directive 2003/54/EU) and envisaged the obligations for network enterprises 
in terms of technical opportunities:  
• Enable the direct connections between the producers and consumers;  
• Offer the distribution services;  
• Allow the accession with network. 
 
Furthermore, the network enterprises we treated as been in dominant position in 
terms of the Competition Act, and there was envisaged the opportunity for price con-
trol and for that the necessary transparency in accounting. Practically the same prin-
ciples are stated also by the new Electricity Market Act (RT I 2003, 25,153), but it is 
done by the regulation which is essentially detailed. Therefore, the Act is less trans-
parent and carries more the sign of lobby work done by Estonian electricity monopoly 
- ‘Eesti Energia’. 
 
For Estonia has given the exception in opening up the electricity market in the EU 
accession treaty until year 2012, because of the protection oil-shale energy interests. 
Nevertheless, the technical preparedness for the opening up the electricity market is 
lacking in the previous EU member states as well. At the same time, it will be clear, 
does it serve the electricity import or export interests, because the adjustment of oil-
shale energy prices concerning the strict EU environmental rules is still in process. 
The current act in force gives the right to choose the electricity deliverer in so-called 
free consumers (consumption overcomes 40 GWh per year) until year 2009. From 
2009, the free-consumer rights for major consumers will be guaranteed in a way, that 
their total consumption will make up at least 35% of the total amount of the market. 
Taking account the EU efforts for the opening up the electricity market in general, we 
may anticipate the pressure to Estonia for the acceleration of its electricity market 
opening process. The similar parallel has been shown through the hints to possible 
fines in case of delaying with regulation concerning the Estonian gas market.  
 
In implementing the network charges Estonia follows the requirements of correspond-
ing EU Directive (concerning the reconciliation and disclosure of prices ex ante). At 
the same time, the price regulation in general is stricter. New Estonian Energy Act (§ 
75) requires besides the network charges to reconcile also the prices of electricity 
and its raw material and oil-shale prices with the Energy Market Inspection. It is   6
probably inevitable until the real opening of the electricity market. In special literature, 
there has been opined, that state ex ante regulation of electricity prices will turn ines-
sential even in case of small-scale consumers. This change assumes also progress 
in measurement technology in addition to opening the markets. Then analogically to 
telecommunication market, there is not any more in the first place the task of regulat-
ing the electricity prices by state, so far as the task of regulating charges of deliverer 
change.  
 
The main problem still stays in network charges regulation or supervision in the future 
as well. Currently the EU Energy Act § 70 envisage not only three types of charges 
(accession charges, charges of using the network connection and charges of for-
warding), but also the opportunities for their differentiation (essentially price discrimi-
nation). Taking into account information asymmetry in favor of network enterprise, it 
stands as an extremely difficult task for Energy Market Inspection.  
 
Herewith the preconditions for privatization of fuel- and energy sector are created – 
there is regulation mechanism replacing the competition. Unfortunately, the privatiza-
tion process failed at the beginning of year 2000, because of poor (non-competitive) 
management of the process and political opposition. Those, who were against the 
privatization process, ignore opinions of political economy (especially capture theory). 
According to the theory, the state agencies, which control monopolies tend to repre-
sent more the interests of enterprises compare to consumers interests. This hazard is 
particularly major concerning in state monopolies by nowadays’ concept. It is be-
cause here the enterprise leaders have more connections with politicians than in 
case of private enterprises.  
 
Of course, the additional saving motives and advantages for effective action from that 
are used better in private enterprises. Differently from Energy Act, tries the Competi-
tion Act to stress another neutralizing mechanism of natural monopolies: replace the 
‘competition in market’ with the ‘competition for market’. For that purpose the monop-
oly has to give in open offering according to the public procurement law (RT I 1995, 
54, 883: 1996, 49, 953). In principle the idea is correct, but can not be the remedy in 
overall. The investments may give the advantage to those participants, who already   7
are in the market longer time and who do not have to worry about cost-effectiveness 
of their investments and also get the better price offers in general.  
 
When in energy sector the regulation has been functioning relatively steady (discon-
tent is connected with the privatization), then much more criticized sector is telecom-
munication. The first object of criticism has been the cable communication law (RT I 
1999, 25, 364). Here the local governments were allowed to divide their territories as 
the market shares for which the Communication Agency gave one or several permis-
sions of cable TV. The one permission was issued in case, if the applicant engaged 
to offer the telephony service as well. Such opportunity for local monopoly provoked 
arguments against. There was the situation, where competition in one particular mar-
ket (cable TV) was contributed because of another competition in telephony service 
market (even more important market).  
 
The followed Telecommunication Act (RT I 2000, 18, 116) points out rather the su-
pervision over the enterprises which have essential market power in telecommunica-
tion market. The attribute of the essential market power is 25% of market share. If the 
market share is more than 40%, then the corresponding articles of the Competition 
Act are applied. It is not obvious, why mobile communication market needs such 
special regulation, especially taking into account the highly concurrent oligopolistic 
market structure. In authors’ opinion, there is enough implementing the regulation of 
enterprise in dominant position.  
 
Also in the railway sector, the deregulation has been bringing up conflicts between 
the market participants. Especially concerned is the former monopoly ‘Eesti Raudtee’ 
who is the owner of the infrastructure, because it lost the control over the railway 
transport service market. The new Railway Act is more radical compare to the first 
one, which required that ‘Eesti Raudtee’ has to give to other enterprises 25% of infra-
structure capacity. Because of the vertical integration of ‘Eesti Raudtee’ the transport 
service market is managed by Railway Inspection at current time, whereby the total 
amount of transportation is given to the open competition. There the ‘Eesti Raudtee’ 
has to compete with others in the equal conditions.  
   8
General conclusion is that corresponding law has made significant developments in 
terms of observed network industries in Estonia recently, but the organizational struc-
ture of regulators is still in developing phase. In order to find suitable solutions for 
small transition country we focus on practical developments and benchmarks con-
cerning the sector regulators and also competition authority.  
 
2. Institutional Aspects of Regulation and Competition Policy 
2.1 Developments in Regulation Practices in Sector-Specific Spheres 
 
Historically, regulators have often been closely related to ministries that manage or 
managed incumbent firms. Perhaps as result, regulatory agencies are sometimes 
perceived as taking actions that appear to serve the interests of the firms being regu-
lated. Greater independence both from political power and the regulated sector are 
crucial for avoiding these perceptions. In many countries, for example OECD coun-
tries, regulatory institutions have increased their levels of independence (The rela-
tionship between …, 2005).  
 
As the transition countries began restructuring and privatizing their infrastructure in 
1990s, they looked to the countries that first had taken this approach, like Canada, 
United Kingdom, United States and Australia. But these countries have long tradi-
tions in regulating the infrastructure, dealing with monopolies and they also have long 
traditions of market capitalism supported by strong legal institutions. Complicated 
matters were caused also because state enterprises in transition economies were 
often organized to achieve political objectives, not to solve market failures (Guasch et 
al 1999).  
 
It was clear that the transition countries are not able to achieve credible, stable and 
effective regulation of infrastructure overnight.  
 
The main problems in transition economies concerning the shortcomings of institu-
tional prerequisites for effective regulation were pointed out by World Bank Policy 
Research Report (Kessides 2004) and included following aspects:  
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• Separation of powers, especially between the executive and the judiciary.  
• Well-functioning, credible political and economic institutions – and an independent 
judiciary.  
• A legal system that safeguards private property from state or regulatory seizure 
without fair compensation and relies on judicial review to protect against regulatory 
abuse of basic principles of fairness.  
• Norms and laws – supported by institutions – that delegate authority to bureaucracy 
and enable it to act relatively independently.  
• Strong contract laws and mechanisms for resolving contract disputes.  
• Sound administrative procedures that provide broad access to the regulatory proc-
ess and make it transparent.  
• Sufficient professional staff trained in relevant economic, accounting, and legal 
principles.  
 
From best practices of developed countries there is well-known that the structure and 
process of infrastructure regulation determine how effectively it supports reforms and 
promotes efficiency and social objectives. For effective regulation of privatized utili-
ties have crucial impact and importance those institutional requirements as coher-
ence, independence, accountability, transparency, predictability and capacity.  
 
By now the process in transition countries has been developed in quite different 
ways. Let’s have a look to the process of regulation in sector-specific spheres in 
some transition countries in 1990s to 2000.  
 
In Hungary the energy regulator’s independence was ranked as limited by a lack of 
autonomous revenue, fixed-term appointments for the board of directors, and well-
defined criteria for appointing and dismissing directors. Also civil service salary caps 
made difficult to attract qualified staff. In telecommunications the head of the sector’s 
regulatory authority reported to the minister of transport and communications (Kes-
sides 2004).  
 
The Czech Republic was also found to lack independent regulators for energy and 
telecommunications – the situation occurred according the government’s ambiva-
lence toward specialized regulatory agencies in the early years of transition. As a   10
result the Ministry of Finance had the final decision in regulating gas and electricity 
prices, while the energy regulator was part of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Similarly, the primary regulator for telecommunications was part of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications (Ibid).  
 
In Poland energy regulator meets most of the formal requirements for independence. 
In Romania telecommunications regulation was find to lack any semblance of inde-
pendence. The minister of industry and trade appoints the chair, vice chair, and three 
of the gas regulator’s board of directors, ensuring ministerial control over the agency. 
Concerning the electricity sector it is pointed out that Romania and Bulgaria have 
taken bold steps to create independent regulators. Romania’s National Electricity and 
Heat Regulatory Authority is a United Kingdom style independent entity, while Bul-
garia’s State Commission for Energy Regulation incorporates elements of United 
States style independent commissions (Ibid).  
 
About Latvia the World Bank Policy Research Report indicates that multi-sector regu-
lator has financial independence from state budget and has shown strong commit-
ment to transparency and accountability. But its independence is compromised by 
the close affiliation between its board members and the political parties that nominate 
them.  
 
As seen from some practices of transition countries the processes of regulating the 
network industries still have to improve. In order to have more clear understanding 
about regulatory system practices let’s focus on some country’s cases more detail 
before analyzing the developments in Estonia.  
 
2.2 Regulatory Institutions – Relevant Experience from Latvia, Germany and 
Netherlands 
 
In Latvia the regulation of public utilities was performed by several institutions until 
October 2001. Energy Regulation Council (ERC) – an institution under supervision of 
the Ministry of Economy was responsible for regulation of energy sector. Ministry of 
Transport and its supervised Telecommunication Tariffs Council (TTC) carried out 
regulation in telecommunications sector. The main tasks of postal sector regulation   11
were performed by the Communication Department of the Ministry of Transport 
(MoT). Railway Administration (RA) supervised by the Ministry of Transport regulated 
the railway sector.  
Practical experience showed that the regulation was rather inefficient due to frag-
mented institutions and limited resources available. Moreover such regulation system 
did not ensure an independent decision making process. The European Union re-
ports on Latvia regularly emphasized the need to strengthen the regulatory process. 
Then, to change the situation and improve the regulatory system an institutional re-
form was implemented.  
 
Already in January 1997 the Latvian government made the decision to set up a uni-
fied regulating institution in energy, telecommunications, post and railway sectors. 
After a four year period for legislation development a new public utilities regulation 
institution – Public Utilities Regulation Commission started its operation in October 
2001 taking over the responsibilities of ERC, TTC, RA and MoT. The Regulator oper-
ates in compliance with the law On Regulators of Public Utilities, Regulator’s statutes, 
sectoral and other normative acts. The Regulator is an institution supervised by the 
Ministry of Economy which is independent for performing the tasks set in legislation 
and the Council of the Regulator is appointed by the Seima.  
 
A multi-sector regulatory model selected in Latvia is not typical for European coun-
tries. In Europe only some countries have multi-sector regulators, for example Lux-
embourg and Germany. However, the approach is widely used in the United States 
and Latin America. For example, multi-industry regulators have been successful in 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Panama and in the states of Brazil (Kessides 2004).  
 
Multi-sector regulation model has several advantages in comparison with a single 
model, as it is possible to: 
• Implement a unified approach in all the regulated sectors, for example, to apply a 
unified tariff calculation method in energy, telecommunications, post and railway sec-
tors, have a unified procedure for issuing licenses, etc.; 
• Take into account the convergence of technologies and services in the regulated 
sectors. In the world the traditional borders between the different sectors are nowa-
days disappearing fast. More active co-operation is observed between enterprises   12
working in different sectors, for instance, between railway and telecommunications. 
Due to technological development, telecommunications take over a considerable part 
of functions earlier performed by postal offices. Energy utilities, in turn, are providing 
telecommunication services. Convergence of sectors creates the necessity to de-
velop a unified system of regulation for all the sectors ant to apply equal regulation 
principles;  
• Harmonize expected tariff changes in separate sectors thus preventing simultane-
ous price increase for public utilities and reduction of the economy’s competitiveness; 
• Attract and effectively utilize the intellectual potential; 
• Make rational use of financial resources. 
 
In Germany the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, 
Post and Railway is a separate higher federal authority within the scope of business 
of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor, and has its headquarters in Bonn. In 
July 2005 the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Post which super-
seded the Federal Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (BMPT) and the Federal 
Office for Post and Telecommunications (BAPT), was renamed Federal Network 
Agency. It acts as the root certification authority as provided for by the Electronic 
Signatures Act.  
 
The Federal Network Agency’s task is to provide, by liberalization and deregulation, 
for the further development of the electricity, gas, telecommunications and postal 
markets and, as from January 2006, also of the railway infrastructure market. For the 
purpose of implementing the aims of regulation, the Agency has effective procedures 
and instruments at its disposal including also rights of information and investigation 
as well as the right to impose graded sanctions.  
 
The Federal Network Agency’s decisions in the fields of electricity, gas, telecommu-
nications and post are made by its Ruling Chambers. The undertakings directly con-
cerned may participate in the Ruling Chamber proceedings. The business circles af-
fected by the proceedings may be summoned.  
 
The Federal Network Agency’s decisions are based on the Telecommunication Act, 
the Postal Act and the Energy Act and can be challenged before court. In case of   13
legal dispute neither the Regulatory Authority nor the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Labor (BMWA) can quash the decision made by the Ruling Chambers. In con-
trast to the provisions of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB) a so-called 
ministerial decision is not foreseen.  
 
The rulings by the Ruling Chambers on telecommunications and postal matters may 
be challenged directly before the Administrative Courts, and before the Civil Courts if 
energy matters are concerned. A procedure is not foreseen. Proceedings on the main 
issue do not have a staying effect.  
 
Conclusion here in general is quite complicated to draw from the experiences of 
competition creation in sector-specific spheres, because as it has been recognized 
from the analysis, the competition creation has been developing in different ways. 
Besides the discussion about regulatory institution type in network industries there 
has been under observation the relationship between competition authorities and 
sectoral regulators (Global Forum on Competition). This particular discussion has 
been started lately (in July, 2007) in Estonia as well. Still one is clear, that sector-
specific regulators and national competition authority have to cooperate in regulation-
for-competition. How to ensure that this cooperation is successful and efficient?  
 
One way to ensure consistency with respect to competition decisions is to unify regu-
lator and competition authority. In this approach towards competition law enforce-
ment of a sector regulator and a competition authority have to merge the regulator 
with the competition authority. One example of merging a regulator with a competition 
authority occurs in the Netherlands, where the government has created chambers 
within competition authority (NMa) for sector regulation. The energy regulator in the 
Netherlands, the Office of Energy Regulation (DTe) is placed under the oversight of 
the competition authority, the NMa. DTe is responsible for the implementation and 
supervision of the Electricity Act of 1998 and the Gas Act of 2000. In 2004, the Office 
of Transport Regulation was set up as another chamber in the NMa. The chamber 
model allows highly specialized knowledge related to sectors exist within the struc-
ture of a competition authority focused on broad issues of improving competition. 
(The relationship between …, 2005). This structure helps in ensuring the consistency 
in application of competition law. If competition authorities are responsible for compe-  14
tition law application in some areas and sector regulators are responsible in other 
then ensuring such consistency can be complicated task.  
 
If there has been decided in favor of independent regulatory agency then still the 
question stays – what is the best solution for regulatory agency. Should the govern-
ment create industry-specific regulators or a single agency with a broader mandate. 
 
For further suggestions we analyze the present institutional position of the Estonian 
Competition Board and its activities. 
 
2.3 Competition Authority in Estonia 
 
There is a large variety in terms of competition policy organization in the international 
practice. At the same time, in theory has been stressed the partial similarity to mone-
tary policy institution — necessity to protect the long-term economic interests from 
the daily political problems. Therefore has been often recommended that competition 
policy body should be relatively independent from executive power. 
 
Looking at the experience of small countries we see the endeavor to separate the 
investigation of competition law violations from corresponding decision making. At 
that the decision making body (Competition Council in Finland and Denmark, Cartel 
Court in Austria) is staffed by participation of parliament, king or president of the 
country. In Switzerland the social cartel commission formed by parliament has impor-
tant role. The competition policy bodies have an important role also in some transition 
countries. In Hungary the President of Competition Board, who is appointed by the 
President of country for six years, is participating in sessions of parliament and gov-
ernment. In Latvia by the law from 1997, the Competition Council from legal person is 
the supervisory body. The members of the Council are appointed by government for 
five years, but one government cannot recall the council member appointed by itself. 
This should help consolidate the independence of decision council. The status of 
council member is not connected with the parliament membership. Therefore the dif-
ferent methods are used in order to achieve one goal – to protect the independence 
of competition policy from government daily policy.    15
In Estonia the Competition Board (Figure 1) has unusually weak position in the state 
structure. It is as usual state board subordinated to the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communications.
1   
 
Probably is that fact reflecting most clearly the understanding that competition policy 
has secondary role in small open economy. In authors’ opinion the stressing of for-
eign economic policy cannot lead to underestimation of processes in internal market. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Organizational Structure of Estonian Competition Board. 
(Source: Estonian Competition Board). 
 
The effectiveness of competition policy also depends on cooperation of executive 
body and court power. The new Estonian Competition Act foresees new solutions in 
work allocation between competition board and courts. The Competition Board is re-
sponsible for discovery the violation of law.
2 In case of impediment the proceeding 
the Competition Board may make precepts to natural or legal persons. In the failure 
to comply with a precept the Competition Board may impose a penalty payment (§ 
62).
3 The violations of law in contents are looked by last changed law firstly as mis-
                                                 
1 The last change in the Act enacts also the cooperation with European Commission according to the 
Act of EU Council 1/2003. 
2 In 2003 the Competition Board had enforcement activities concerning enterprises in total number of 
decisions 71. From which 21 cases were in abuse of dominant position/monopolistic power in the mar-
ket, 2 cases of cartel agreements, 9 cases on other prohibited (horizontal and vertical) agreements, 39 
cases of control of mergers, concentrations and acquisitions.  
3 For natural person up to 50 000 and for legal person 100 000 EEK.   16
demeanor for which shall be sanctions: for physical person fine or arrest; for legal 
person fine up to 500 000 EEK. This last one is essentially modest compare to rela-
tively usual rate, which was also in the former versions of Estonian law – up to 10% 
from previous year turnover. At the same time, there is complemented also criminal 
procedure, which gives first time the possibility to take criminal liability natural person, 
who are in fault in impairing the competition if there has been applied the punishment 
for the same misdemeanor before. The sanctions are in form of the fines or up to 3 
years imprisonment. Though it is Estonian peculiarity at the first place and there is no 
hurry to cancel it as the competition board pursues, because the discussion contin-
ues at European level.  
 
In Table 1 there are given activities of the Estonian Competition Board. This indicates 
the range of activities done by competition authority. 
 
Table 1. Activities by the Competition Board in 2005 
 
In the context of competition authority position in the state structure in Estonia, there 
is need to point out the issue concerning the relationship of the Estonian Competition 
Board with state regulators of independent branches of economy. As seen from in-
ternational practices there is discussion about the expediency to combine them. Here 
we can find the arguments from both sides as in favor and as against. Nevertheless, 
in small country (especially in transition period) the combining should strengthen the 
general status of competition policy and administrative capacity. Because all the 
regulators have at least one common task – control over the dominant enterprise, no 
matter  ex ante or  ex post. The Supervisory Inspection at Bank of Estonia (Eesti 
Pank) could be set an example.    17
In terms of developments concerning the institutional structure for competition policy 
implementation is also useful to consider experience and practices from countries 
which have had success in particular spheres.  
 
From former experience of other countries is known that establishing separate agen-
cies for regulating gives possibilities to recognize the unique economic and techno-
logical characteristics of each infrastructure industry and enables regulators to de-
velop more detailed industry-specific expertise. It also reduces the risk of institutional 
failure and encourages innovative responses to regulatory challenges.  
 
Implementing the model of one regulator for several industries makes possible to 
share fixed costs, scarce human and other resources. Also consolidation builds ex-
pertise in cross-cutting regulatory issues: administering tariff adjustment rules, intro-
ducing competition in monopolistic industries, and managing relationships with 
stakeholders (Kessides 2004). In addition, the broader responsibilities of a multi-
industry agency reduce its dependence on any one industry and so help protect 
against capture and may be better able to resist political interference because its 
broader constituency gives to it greater independence from sector ministries.  
 
Authors recommend for Estonia primarily the regulatory institution model imple-
mented in Latvia, where different sector regulators are aggregated into one institution 
– the Public Utilities Regulation Commission. This example of combined regulatory 
institution allows to ensure regulatory consistency, technological convergence and 
also make better use of human and financial resources. Because small economies 
have limited human and financial resources the particular model of regulatory institu-
tion gives an opportunity for merging regulatory responsibilities. Under the considera-
tion should be the model of regulator and competition authority unified institution, 
which has been implemented in Netherlands, as next step in developments of regu-
lating network industries. This solution of unified institution will ensure internal consis-
tency with respect to competition decisions and increase the authority of competition 
policy.  
 
In addition, there are some other arguments for one regulatory institution as market 
substitution aspect between the output of regulated industries – especially between   18
electricity and gas, and also between modes of transportation and telecommunica-
tions. One has also take into consideration reasons arising from scarcity of expertise 




There are markets in which competition policy will lead to satisfactory results and 
other markets which need regulation in order to attain the efficient goal. Competition 
authorities and sector regulations have different core competencies. In the process of 
applying competition laws in regulated sectors, competition authorities can benefit 
from the technical expertise of sector regulators and should seek to co-operate with 
sector regulators to benefit from this expertise.  
 
Nevertheless the competition replacement with public regulation is economically rea-
sonable only in essence of natural monopolies, for example different supplying and 
distributional networks. There it concerns only managing the essence of monopoly – 
the networks.  
 
In Estonia the corresponding laws which regulate network industries have been de-
veloped significantly in recent years, but the institutional structure is still in developing 
phase. For finding the suitable solution of regulating arrangement in network indus-
tries the experience of regulatory institutions in Latvia, Germany and Netherlands has 
been under the observation by authors. One possibly suitable model of regulatory 
institution for Estonia seems to be a multi-sector institution where different sector 
regulators are aggregated. This type of combined regulatory institution reduces its 
dependency on any one industry, protects against capture, ensures the regulatory 
consistency and also makes better use of human and financial resources, which are 
limited especially in small economies. The next step further from the multi-sector 
regulatory institution is merging sector regulators with a competition authority.    19
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